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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
V.
)
CHRISTOPHER DAVID PIELSTICK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NO. 47343-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0I-18-53476

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Christopher D. Pielstick pied guilty to felony domestic violence, the district court
sentenced him to ten years, with three years fixed. Mr. Pielstick appeals, and he argues the
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Pielstick committed the crimes of
attempted strangulation and domestic violence in the presence of a child. (R., pp.10-11.)
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According to the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"), 1 Mr. Pielstick and his now ex-wife
got into an argument one night, and it turned physical. (PSI, p.3.) At one point, Mr. Pielstick
allegedly threw his ex-wife on the ground and tried to strangle her. (PSI, p.3.) Their
was present for much of the incident. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Pielstick waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to district
court. (R., pp.68, 69-70.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Pielstick with these two
offenses. (R., pp.71-72.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Pielstick pled guilty to domestic
violence in the presence of a child. (Tr.,2 p.5, L.8-p.6, L.24, p.25, Ls.15-24; R., p.97.) The State
agreed to dismissal of the attempted strangulation charge. (Tr., p.5, Ls.11-16, p.6, Ls.8-14; see
R., p.140 (dismissal of charge).)
At sentencing, the State recommended the district court impose a sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed. (Tr., p.52, Ls.16-21, p.53, Ls.11-12.) Mr. Pielstick requested the district
court sentence him to six years, with two years fixed, and suspend the sentence or retain
jurisdiction ("a rider"). (Tr., p.54, Ls.2-6.) The district court agreed with the State's
recommendation and sentenced Mr. Pielstick to ten years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.65,
Ls.12-10.) The district court entered a judgment of conviction, and Mr. Pielstick timely
appealed. (R., pp.139--41, 144--45.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Pielstick to ten years, with three
years fixed, for felony domestic violence?

1

Citations to the PSI refer to the 655-page electronic document with the confidential sentencing
materials, titled "Pielstick 47343 psi."
2
There are two electronic transcripts on appeal, but only one is cited herein. Citations to "Tr."
refer to the seventeen-page transcript with four hearings: entry of plea, sentencing, motion to
withdraw guilty plea, and second sentencing. The other three-page transcript, which contains two
motion hearings, is not cited herein.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Pielstick To Ten Years, With
Three Years Fixed, For Felony Domestic Violence
"It is well-established that ' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence."' State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Pielstick's sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 18-918(2)(b), (4) (twenty-year maximum). Accordingly, to show that the
sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Pielstick "must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." State v. Strand, 13 7
Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The district court's decision to retain jurisdiction is also reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677 (Ct. App. 2005). "The primary purpose of the
retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to gain additional information regarding
the defendant's rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation." Id. at 676. "[P]robation is
the ultimate objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction." Id. at 677. "There can be
no abuse of discretion in a trial court's refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has
sufficient information upon which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for
probation." Id. Similarly, "[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court .... " State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615
(Ct. App. 1990).
"'Reasonableness' of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
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In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. "A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
pnmary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution." State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Here, Mr. Pielstick asserts the district court did not exercise reason and therefore abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts.
Specifically, he contends the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of
imprisonment, retained jurisdiction, or probation in light of the mitigating factors, including his
past drug and alcohol use, prosocial activities and employment history, and acceptance of
responsibility and remorse.
First,

Mr. Pielstick's past drug and alcohol use stand in favor of a

more lenient sentence. A sentencing court should give "proper consideration of the defendant's
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing [the] defendant to commit the crime and the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The
impact of substance abuse on the defendant's criminal conduct is "a proper consideration in
mitigation of punishment upon sentencing." State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981).
Here, Mr. Pielstick started drinking at age twenty-one, but he quickly ended up drinking every
day and getting drunk weekly. (PSI, pp.15, 225.) He also used methamphetamine for about three
months. (PSI, pp.14-15, 225.) Eventually, due in large part to his drug and alcohol use,
Mr. Pielstick went to prison for robbery in 2003. (Tr. Vol. I, p.54, L.15-p.55, L.5; PSI, p.212.)
He admitted that he committed the robbery to get money for methamphetamine and alcohol.
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(PSI, pp.212, 225.) Mr. Pielstick's past drug and alcohol use, as well as its impact on his criminal
conduct, is a mitigating factor in support of a lesser sentence.
Second, Mr. Pielstick's success once discharged from parole also supports leniency in
sentencing. After the robbery conviction, Mr. Pielstick was initially paroled in 2008. (PSI, p.10.)
He began studying for an associate's degree in automotive technology at the College of Western
Idaho. (PSI, p.12; Tr., p.55, Ls.9-10.) He met his ex-wife there, and they had their son. (PSI,
p.12; Tr., p.55, Ls.11-14.) Mr. Pielstick also got sober. (Tr. Vol. I, p.55, Ls.6-8.) Unfortunately,
due to some mental health issues and relapses, Mr. Pielstick returned to prison for parole
violations in 2010 and 2012. (PSI, p.10; Tr., p.55, Ls.14-18.) In 2014, however, Mr. Pielstick
was paroled again, and he had no further issues. (PSI, p.10.) In 2016, he started working at Larry
Miller Dodge. (PSI, p.13.) In 2017, Mr. Pielstick was transferred to the limited supervision unit,
and, in 2018, he was discharged from parole with a "Gold Seal." (PSI, p.10.) He remained
employed at Larry Miller Dodge as a lead technician until the instant offense. (PSI, p.13.) Along
with his gainful employment, Mr. Pielstick went to the Salvation Army for assistance and Bible
studies, and an employee there found him to be "always clean-cut, appreciative and very
respectful." (PSI, p.52.) He also volunteered at the Boise Rescue Mission and attended the Kuna
Life Church. (PSI, pp.11, 53.) In addition, he engaged in positive activities and hobbies,
including fishing, gardening, riding motorcycles, Church softball, and car repair. (PSI, p.11.) His
goals were to complete his associate's degree and obtain a commercial driver's license. (PSI,
p.12.) He had six credits left to fmish his degree. (PSI, p.12.) He also wanted to stop drinking.
(PSI, p.15.) He planned to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and rely on his sponsor for support.
(PSI, pp.15, 651.) This mitigating information on Mr. Pielstick's positive activities and
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community involvement, gainful employment, and renewed commitment to his sobriety justify a
more lenient sentence, including a rider or probation.
Finally, Mr. Pielstick has expressed remorse and accepts responsibility for the crime.
Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation. State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). During the presentence interview, Mr. Pielstick stated that

he felt "stupid, sorry, full of regret for doing what I did." (PSI, p.7.) At sentencing, he explained
to the district court that he was very motivated to engage in treatment for domestic violence and
alcohol abuse. (Tr., p.60, Ls.14-20, p.61, L.25-p.62, L.13, p.62, Ls.16-23.) He recognized that it
was not healthy to be in a relationship with his ex-wife, and he needed to give her space.
(Tr., p.59, Ls.9-12, p.61, Ls.1-5, p.62, Ls.13-15, p.62, Ls.23-25.) He also apologized: "Your
Honor, I do hope that some day [the victim] does not feel as hurt as she does or as she was or as
frightened. I hope she is able to heal. I understand my actions have impacted her immensely and
I apologize for those today in court." (Tr., p.63, Ls.1-5.) These statements of acceptance,
remorse, and regret stand in favor of mitigation.
In sum, Mr. Pielstick maintains the district court did not exercise reason at sentencing
because it failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors in his case. Proper
consideration of these factors support a lesser prison sentence, a rider, or probation. Therefore,
Mr. Pielstick submits the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Pielstick respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 25 th day of March, 2020.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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